Die Unvernunft des Einzelnen - Wir Alltagsidioten | Tagesspiegel schrieb:

Der Satz, die Freiheit eines jeden gehe nur so weit, dass sie die Freiheit anderer nicht einschränkt, ist ja gerade deshalb so einleuchtend, weil er sich auf die Solidargemeinschaft der Zeitgenossen bezieht. Er enthält einen Interessenausgleich, der intuitiv als gerecht empfunden wird, denn dafür, dass ich mich beschränke, beschränken sich auch die anderen. Zukünftige Generationen können den Jetzt-Menschen nichts zurückgeben. Natürlich kommt auch hier die Verhältnismäßigkeit ins Spiel. Je größer die Freiheitseinschränkung für die Zukünftigen (und sie ist, nach allem was wir wissen, gigantisch), desto weniger fällt der eigene Verzicht ins Gewicht. Das Dilemma des „überzeitlichen Freiheitsausgleichs“ bleibt aber, dass er schwieriger zu vermitteln ist.

• Investors have become more concerned about recession risk in recent months,nas financial conditions have tightened and growth has slowed. On the surface,the worry is understandable, as soft landings are exceedingly rare in US history.
  
• During the “Great Moderation” period before 2007, many economists werenhopeful that various structural and policy changes had made the economyfundamentally less recession-prone. While this view took a serious hit in thecrisis and the subsequent deep recession, we think many aspects of the GreatModeration are still intact, and some have even strengthened.
  
• A review of the last century of US recessions highlights five major causes:nindustrial shocks and inventory imbalances; oil shocks; inflationary overheatingthat leads to aggressive rate hikes; financial imbalances and asset price crashes;and fiscal tightening.
  
• The first three causes of recession have become structurally less threatening, innour view. Better inventory management and the shrinking output share of themost cyclical sectors have reduced the impact of industrial fluctuations. Thedecline in the economy’s energy intensity and the rise of shale have reduced theimpact of oil price shocks. And better monetary policy has led to a flatter andmore anchored Phillips curve, reducing the risk of inflationary overheating.
  
• The fourth cause, financial risk, has been the main source of recent recessions.nOld risks could reemerge, and the growing financialization of the economy orshocks from abroad could create new risks. But for now, regulation and privatesector restraint in the post-crisis environment have kept financial risk subdued.
  
• The fifth cause, fiscal policy, has historically meant major postwarndemobilizations on a scale not seen since the Korean War. But here too, newrisks could emerge in an era of political polarization, uncertainty, and dysfunction.
  

• Overall, the changes underlying the Great Moderation appear intact, and we seenthe economy as structurally less recession-prone today. While new risks couldemerge, none of the main sources of recent recessions—oil shocks, inflationaryoverheating, and financial imbalances—seem too concerning for now. As aresult, the prospects for a soft landing look better than widely thought.
  

The sad truth about our boldest climate target | David Roberts | Vox schrieb:

After all, it is possible to end global poverty in a decade, or even less. We have the technology to do so; it’s called money. The people who have more could give enough to those with less so that everyone had a decent life. Similarly, it’s possible to end global homelessness, habitat destruction, hunger, and war. The resources exist. All we lack is the political will.But we haven’t ended those things. There are lots and lots of ways to reduce suffering that are possible, and have been possible for a long time, and we still don’t do them. We don’t even do a fraction of what we could to reduce immediate, visible suffering, much less the suffering of future generations and far-off populations. It turns out to be extraordinarily difficult to generate and effectively deploy the political power needed to secure beneficial policies (and hold them in place over time).

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Secondly and consequently, the level of action and coordination necessary to limit global warming to 1.5˚C utterly dwarfs anything that has ever happened on any other large-scale problem that humanity has ever faced. The only analogy that has ever come close to capturing what’s necessary is “wartime mobilization,” but it requires imagining the kind of mobilization that the US achieved for less than a decade during WWII happening in every large economy at once, and sustaining itself for the remainder of the century.

(((luke))) schrieb:

Leute sagen mir, als Antwort auf meinen Pessimismus, dass die Menschheit bisher jede Herausforderung bewältigt hat, dass wir bisher mit allen Katastrophen fertig geworden sind

Emily Atkin schrieb:

Disaster experts can predict how most people will react: Most will try to work together to save the most people possible. As Erik Auf Der Heide, a leading disaster expert with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, has written, “antisocial behaviors are uncommon in typical disaster situations.” I’ve observed this myself, in natural disasters in places as different as Haiti and Staten Island, for almost all people.

But there is a notable exception. The richest people on the ship are the least likely to cooperate. There is a formal term for this, based on a 2008 paper by the sociologists Caron Chess and Lee Clarke. It’s called “elite panic.”